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Abstract Safety is a concern in almost all branches of engineering. Whereas safety
was traditionally introduced by applying safety factors or margins to the calculated
maximum load, this approach is increasingly replaced with probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) as a tool for dimensioning safety measures. In this paper, the
two approaches are compared in terms of what they aim at and what they can, in
fact, achieve. The outcome of this comparison suggests that the two approaches
should be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. PRA is particularly
useful for priority setting and for the effect evaluation of safety measures; however,
in most applications, uncertainties prevent PRA from providing an objective
probability of failure or value of damage. Safety factors are indispensible for
dealing with dangers that cannot be assigned meaningful probabilities.
Keywords Safety factor . Risk . Uncertainty . Vulnerability . Probabilistic design .
PRA
1 Introduction
Safety is a concern in almost all branches of engineering. In structural engineering,
for example, builders add extra strength in order to ensure the safety of their
structures. This safety margin serves to protect individuals and society from the
consequences of failure. The practice of adding extra strength to a construction can
be traced back at least to antiquity; however, it is only in the nineteenth century that
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numerical safety factors were introduced to determine the sizes of these safety
margins (Randall 1976). A safety factor is a ratio between the maximal load not
leading to failure and the maximal load for which the construction is intended. In the
last few decades, attempts have been made to replace safety factors by probabilistic
calculations. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA, also probabilistic safety assess-
ment) is now increasingly used as a tool for dimensioning safety measures (Bedford
and Cooke 2001; Vose 2000). With these methods, safety margins are calibrated to
achieve a certain, sufficiently low, calculated probability of failure.
Probabilistic methodology has the obvious advantage of directly addressing the
crucial goal of safety engineering, namely to reduce the probability of accidents and
other adverse events. Safety factors address this goal only in a more indirect way.
Proponents of probabilistic methods have been keen to point out that “the safety of the
building constructions is a matter of calculating probabilities” (Mayer 1926; quoted in
Elishakoff 2004: p. 1) and that “probability theory provides a more accurate
engineering representation of reality” (Cornell 1969: p. 974); however, these general
considerations are not sufficient to prove that probabilistic methodology is superior to
the safety factor approach. The crucial issue is whether its use in practical engineering
design will indeed promote safety more efficiently than the use of safety factors.
Proponents of safety factors have argued that replacing them by probabilistic
approaches would be “a dangerous lapse” (Knoll 1976), and it has been argued that
probabilistic analysis tends to neglect some of the safety–critical issues that are
traditionally covered by safety factors (Clausen et al. 2006; Möller and Hansson 2008).
Decision making regarding safety and risks is philosophically relevant for several
reasons. First, different approaches to risk analysis represent different philosophical
theories. Standard risk–benefit analysis, for example, is similar to classical
utilitarianism in its disregard for persons. Drawbacks of classical utilitarianism
pertain to risk–benefit as well (Hansson 2007). Secondly, although the establishment
of risk exposure limits and other regulations is often presented as “scientific” and
“value-free,” risk-related decisions often contain value-based judgments on what
risks to accept. It typically requires philosophical expertise to uncover these hidden
value assumptions in decision making on technological risks (Hansson 2009c).
Thirdly, risk-related decision making requires comparisons of values that are
difficult, often seemingly impossible, to compare to each other: losses in human life,
disabilities and diseases, the loss of animal species, etc. This issue of value
incommensurability is a recurrent problem in philosophy in general and in the
philosophy of engineering design in particular (Chang 1997; Van de Poel 2009).
In this paper, we will compare the two approaches in terms of what they aim at and
what they can in fact achieve. In Section 2, some concepts that are crucial for the
discussion will be clarified. We introduce safety factors in Section 3 and probabilistic
analysis in Section 4. This is followed by overviews of the arguments for probabilistic
design (Section 5) and safety factors (Section 6). In Section 7 we sum up and conclude.
2 Basic Terminology
The distinction between risk and uncertainty dates back to work in the early
twentieth century by the economists JM Keynes and FH Knight (Arrow 1951;
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Keynes 1921; Knight 1935[1921]). Knight pointed out that “[t]he term ‘risk’, as
loosely used in everyday speech and in economic discussion, really covers two
things which, functionally at least, in their causal relations to the phenomena of
economic organization, are categorically different.” In some cases, “risk” means “a
quantity susceptible of measurement,” in other cases “something distinctly not of
this character.” He proposed to reserve the term “uncertainty” for cases of the non-
quantifiable type, and the term “risk” for the quantifiable cases (Knight 1935[1921]:
pp. 19–20).
This terminological reform has spread to other disciplines, including engineering
and it is now commonly assumed in most scientific and engineering contexts that
“risk” refers to something that can be assigned a probability, whereas “uncertainty”
may be difficult or impossible to quantify. It should be noted, however, that in
everyday language, “risk” is often used without reference to probability. It should
also be observed that although uncertainty and risk are commonly defined as two
mutually exclusive concepts, it is in practice common to use “uncertainty” in lieu of
“risk or uncertainty.” Then “uncertainty” is used as a general term for lack of
knowledge (whether probabilistic or not), and risk is a special form of uncertainty,
characterized by the availability of a meaningful probability estimate. In what
follows, we will adhere to this practice and use “uncertainty” in the broad sense that
covers (probabilizable) risk.
Even in cases when the plausibility of a danger can be meaningfully summarized
in a probability estimate, there may yet remain significant uncertainties about the
accuracy of this estimate. In fact, only very rarely are probabilities known with
certainty. Therefore, even if a decision problem is treated as a decision “under risk,”
then this does not mean that the decision in question is made under conditions of
completely known probabilities. Rather, it means that a choice has been made to
simplify the description of this decision problem by treating it as a case of known
probabilities. This is practically important in safety engineering. Some of the
probability estimates used in risk calculations are quite uncertain. Such uncertainty
about probabilities should be taken into account when probabilistic analyses are
used for decision-making purposes.
The unclear role of scientists taking part in risk policy decisions led in the 1970s
to increasing awareness of the distinction between scientific assessments and policy
decisions based on these assessments. This resulted in a standard view on the risk
decision process that distinguishes strictly between its scientific and policy-making
parts. This view was expressed in a 1983 report by the American National Academy
of Sciences (National Research Council 1983). The decision procedure is divided
into two distinct parts to be performed consecutively. The first of these, commonly
called “risk assessment,” is a scientific undertaking. It consists of collecting and
assessing the relevant information and on this base characterizing the nature and
magnitude of the risk. The second procedure is called “risk management.” Contrary
to risk assessment, this is not a scientific undertaking. Its starting point is the
outcome of risk assessment, which it combines with economical and technological
information pertaining to various ways of reducing or eliminating the risk in
question, and also with political and social information. Based on this, a decision is
made on what measures—if any—should be taken to reduce the risk. In order to
protect risk assessments from being manipulated to meet predetermined policy
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objectives, it was proposed to separate risk assessment organizationally from risk
management; however, in spite of many official documents promoting this division
between risk assessment and risk management, it is more often violated than obeyed.
In the public sector, it is often applied in areas where risk decisions are
controversial and publicly debated, such as the control of chemicals. In areas where
risk management is conceived as uncontroversial, such as the setting of technical
standards for building constructions, risk management and risk assessment are
usually performed by the same persons and in the same expert committees (Clausen
and Hansson 2007). In the private sector, efficiency and coordination are prioritized,
and therefore the management systems used in this sector tend not to be easily
combined with a high degree of independence for a group of experts, such as risk
assessors. We are not aware of any case of strict separation between risk assessment
and risk management in the private sector.
Both the safety factors approach and the probabilistic approach to engineering
design employ numerical limits to draw the line between sufficiently safe and too
unsafe designs. These limits are different in nature, but in both cases they are, in
practice, determined within the community of safety experts in a process that does
not distinguish between risk assessment and risk management.
3 The Safety Factor Approach
The use of safety factors is a well-established method in the various branches of
structural engineering. A safety factor is typically intended to protect against a
particular integrity-threatening mechanism, and different safety factors can be
used against different such mechanisms. Most commonly, a safety factor is
defined as the ratio between a measure of the maximum load not leading to
failure and a corresponding measure of the applied load. In some cases it may
instead be defined as the ratio between the estimated design life and the actual
service life. In addition to safety factors, the related concept of safety margin is
used in several contexts. Safety margins are additive rather than multiplicative;
typically a safety margin in structural engineering is then defined as capacity
minus load.
It is generally agreed in the literature on structural engineering that safety factors
are intended to compensate for five major types of sources of failure:
(1) Higher loads than those foreseen,
(2) Worse properties of the material than foreseen,
(3) Imperfect theory of the failure mechanism in question,
(4) Possibly unknown failure mechanisms, and
(5) Human error (e.g., in design) (Knoll 1976; Moses 1997).
The first two of these can in general be classified as variabilities, that is, they
refer to the variability of empirical indicators of the propensity for failure. They
are therefore accessible to probabilistic assessment (although these assessments
may be more or less uncertain). In the technical terminology that distinguishes
between risk and uncertainty they can be subsumed under the category of risk.
The last three failure types refer to eventualities that are difficult or impossible to
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represent in probabilistic terms, and therefore belong to the category of (non-
probabilizable) uncertainty.
In order to provide adequate protection, a system of safety factors will have to
consider all the integrity-threateningmechanisms that can occur. For instance, one safety
factor may be required for resistance to plastic deformation and another one for fatigue
resistance. Also different loading situations may be taken into account, such as
permanent load (“dead load”; that is, the weight of the building) and variable load (“live
load”; that is, the loads produced by the use and occupancy of the building); the safety
factor of the latter being higher because of higher variabilities. Similarly, components
with widely varying material properties (e.g., brittle materials such as glass) are subject
to higher safety factors than components of less variable materials (e.g., steel and
metallic materials). Geographic properties may be taken into account by applying
additional wind and earthquake factors. Design criteria employing safety factors can be
found in numerous engineering standards and building codes.
4 Probabilistic Risk (Safety) Assessment
Modern probabilistic risk assessment has largely been developed in the nuclear industry.
Although the engineers designing nuclear reactors in the 1950s and 1960s aimed at
keeping the probability of accidents very low, they did not have any means to estimate
these probabilities. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, methodology was developed to
make such estimates. The first PRA of a nuclear reactor was the Rasmussen report
(WASH-1400) that was published in 1975 (Michal 2000; Rasmussen 1975). The basic
methodology used in this report is still used, with various improvements, both in the
nuclear industry and in an increasing number of other industries as a means to
calculate and efficiently reduce the probability of accidents.
A PRA usually begins with the identification of the undesirable events to be covered
by the analysis. In a nuclear reactor, most of these will be various types of accidents
leading to core damage (“meltdown”) or to the release of radioactivity. The next step is
to identify for each of these adverse events the accident sequences that may lead to its
occurrence. Typically, several such sequences will be identified for each event. Each
sequence is a chain containing events such as mechanical equipment failure, software
failure, lacking or faulty maintenance, mistakes in the control room, etc. Next, the
probability of each of these accident sequences is calculated, based on the probability of
each event in the sequence. Some of these probabilities can be based on empirical
evidence, but others have to be based on expert assessments. The final step in the PRA
consists in combining all this information into an overall assessment. In the early days of
PRA, the overall assessment often included a total probability of a major accident and/or
a statistical expectation value for the number of deaths per year resulting from accidents
in the plant. Today, most PRA specialists in the nuclear industry consider such overall
calculations too uncertain. Instead, their focus is on using analysis of accident sequences
to identify weaknesses in the safety system. According to one leading expert, the final
step in a PRA
... is to rank the accident sequences according to their probability of
occurrence. This is done because risk must be managed; knowing the major
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contributors to each undesirable event that was defined in the first step is a
major element of risk management. Also ranked are the SSCs—systems,
structures, and components—according to their contribution to the undesirable
event (Michal 2000: pp. 27–28).
The same basic methodology can be used in structural engineering. In the early
2000s, the Joint Committee on Structural Safety (JCSS) developed a Probabilistic
Model Code for full probabilistic design. The code was intended as the operational
part of national and transnational building codes that allow for probabilistic design
but do not give any detailed guidance (Vrouwenvelder 2002). Contrary to the
nuclear industry, structural engineering uses PRA more to dimension individual
components than to identify and analyze different accident sequences (JCSS 2001;
Melchers 2002). This difference depends in part on the complicated redistribution of
the load effects after each component failure, which makes it difficult to predict the
behavior of the system itself (Ditlevsen and Madsen 2007[1996]); however, attempts
are made to broaden the scope of PRA in structural engineering and to view building
structures as parts of wider infrastructure systems (Blockley and Godfrey 2000;
Melchers 2007).
Within structural engineering practice, most PRA specialists defend a Bayesian
interpretation of failure probabilities, in which “probabilities are considered as the
best possible expression of the degree of belief in the occurrence of a certain event”
and not as “unbiased predictors of occurrence frequencies that can be observed in
practice” (JCSS 2001: p. 60; see also Ditlevsen and Madsen 2007[1996]).
5 Arguments for Using Probabilistic Design Methods
In the literature, we have found four arguments that are used to support the view that
probabilistic approaches to design are preferable to deterministic ones such as safety
factors. These are the possibility of economic optimization, improved precision,
integral approach, and fitness for policy making (risk management). In this section,
we will discuss each of these arguments.
5.1 Economic Optimization
The first, and probably most important, argument used in favor of probabilistic
methods is that their output can be used as an input into economic optimization.
Some argue that economic optimization of risk management measures is in fact the
main objective of probabilistic risk analysis (Guikema and Paté-Cornell 2002).
Traditional approaches in safety engineering, such as safety factors, provide
regulatory bounds that may sometimes be overly conservative (Chapman et al.
1998). There is, for instance, no way to translate the difference between using the
safety factor 2.0 and the safety factor 3.0 in the design of a bridge into a quantifiable
effect on safety. Without a quantifiable effect (such as reduced expected number of
fatalities) it is not possible to calculate the marginal cost of risk reduction, and
therefore economic optimization of design is not possible. In contrast, a PRA that
provides accident probabilities as outcomes makes it possible to calculate the
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expected gains from a safer design. This is what is needed for an optimization of the
trade-off between risks and benefits (Moses 1997; Paté-Cornell 1996).
Such optimization may involve trade-offs against other factors than money. A risk
can, for instance, be weighed against other risks that are brought about by
countermeasures against the first risk (Graham and Wiener 1995). It is also common
for overdesign to have a price in terms of excess usage of energy and other natural
resources. Accident probabilities obtained in a PRA can be used as inputs into a
risk–benefit analysis (RBA) or cost–benefit analysis (CBA) in which different types
of advantages and disadvantages are taken into account (Rackwitz 2004). In such an
analysis, the different types of outcomes, including bodily injuries and loss of lives,
are all assigned monetary values in order to achieve comparability. Madsen et al.
(1986) warn that in the case of human lives, the trade-off between costs and risks
cannot be reduced to technical quantification but should be supplemented with a
variety of approaches in the practical selection of socially accepted safety levels (for
a similar plea, see Hampshire 1972). Although the CBA methodology has many
problems (Hansson 2007) it is widely used as a basis for economic decision making,
in particular, in the public sector (Nathwani et al. 1997; Rackwitz 2001).
The major problem with this argument for PRA is that it puts very high demands
on the probabilities that are outputs of the analysis. As we saw above, PRA analysts
in the nuclear industry have largely given up the original idea that the outputs of
probabilistic analysis of event sequences in nuclear reactors could be interpreted as
reasonably accurate probabilities of various types of accidents. Instead, these
calculations are used primarily to compare different event sequences and to identify
critical elements in these sequences. If the outcome of PRA is interpreted in this
latter sense, then the use of these probabilities as inputs into RBA or CBA is not
justified.
The question that must be asked, then, is whether the outputs of PRAs in non-
nuclear contexts, such as civil engineering, are accurate enough to be used as inputs
into economic analysis. The answer to this question seems to differ between different
contexts. Some relatively small and standardized infrastructure projects have effects
that can be described fairly accurately in probabilistic terms. This applies for
instance to some safety measures in road traffic such as central barriers on highways
(Mak et al. 1998) or pedestrian crosswalks at intersections (Zegeer et al. 2006), for
which the expected number of saved lives can be estimated with reasonable accuracy
and weighed against the economic costs. On the other hand, in case of larger and
more complex infrastructure projects, the probabilistic quantification of the effects of
safety measures is generally not considered accurate enough to be used as direct
input into economic analysis. The safety of gravity dams, for example, is largely
dependent on seismic activity and how the structure responds to it. Both can, at
most, be quantified artificially and roughly, making it difficult to provide accurate
accident probabilities (Abbas and Manohar 2002). In cases like this, it is therefore
recommended to develop a robust structural design rather than an economically
optimized one (Takewaki 2005). Similar problems are faced in the design of other
large infrastructure projects, such as flood defense structures and offshore facilities.
In summary, the argument that PRA provides means for economic optimization is
not valid for PRA in general but only for those PRAs that provide probability
estimates that are well calibrated with actual frequencies.
Should Probabilistic Design Replace Safety Factors? 157
5.2 Improved Precision
The second argument in favor of probabilistic approaches states that probabilistic
analysis is able to provide a more precise description of the design parameters. This
argument is based on the presumed nature of risks and uncertainties. Savchuck
(1992), for example, argues that contrary to traditional design approaches, the
variables in probabilistic design methods are assumed to be random, which
corresponds to the nature of the real states. Similarly, Thoft-Christensen and Baker
state in the preface of their classical textbook that “most loads and other structural
design parameters are rarely known with certainty and should be regarded as random
variables or stochastic processes” (Thoft-Christensen and Baker 1982); however, this
argument in favor of probabilistic modeling is weak for three reasons. First,
describing the full stochastic behavior of a particular variable is not necessarily the
best way of depicting it for all purposes. For example, for most purposes it would be
of little worth to describe the behavior of a gas in terms of the stochastic properties
of individual gas molecules.
Secondly, due to lack of data, probabilistic models may not always have the
qualities needed for the alleged increase in precision to take place. The empirical
basis of probabilistic models has to rely on events that are common enough to have
given rise to data about their occurrence; however, in risk analysis the probabilities
of very uncommon events may be the most important ones. Often such probabilities
are inferred from models that are based on more common events. Although the
central parts of the statistical distributions used in these models are fairly well-
known, their tails can only be inferred under assumptions about the mathematical
structure of the distribution that lack direct empirical evidence. This is the so-called
distribution arbitrariness (Ditlevsen 1994; Harris and Soms 1983). Extreme value
analysis often involves extrapolation to values beyond the largest or smallest
observed value in order to assign probabilities to extreme events. Expert judgments
(Slijkhuis et al. 1999) and boot-strapping techniques (Caers and Maes 1998) are used
to reduce the uncertainty of the tail-based estimates; however, boot-strapping
techniques still require sufficiently long data records and a careful analysis of the
influence of data sampling uncertainties (Van Noortwijk and Van Gelder 1998).
Thirdly, many PRAs refer to situations that are influenced by uncertainties that
are difficult or impossible to quantify. This can be dealt with either by excluding
such uncertainties from consideration or by assigning values to them that may not be
much better than guesses. Even if such values are precise in the sense of being exact,
they are seldom accurate.
Serious objections have been raised against the introduction of such unreliable
probabilities into probabilistic models. When uncertainty is introduced quantitatively
in the probabilistic models, human knowledge becomes part of the system. In
practice, this can mean that the probability of failure can be “improved by [...]
increasing our knowledge” (Vrijling 2001: p. 340). If we are interested in the
probability that a technological system will function successfully for a specific
period of time, then this is a rather awkward conclusion. When striving to reduce the
probability of system failure we are focusing on a property of the system that does
not depend on the available knowledge but on the physical properties of the system
itself. This is not a mere theoretical objection. The quantitative inclusion of
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epistemic uncertainty in a probabilistic analysis may lead to suboptimal risk
mitigation—contrary to the common assumption that the use of probabilistic
approaches promotes efficiency in risk reduction.
In sum, the presumed precision of probabilistic methods in assessing uncertainty
is a rather weak argument. High precision can be misleading, and even dangerously
so, if the accuracy is low.
5.3 Integrated System Approach
A third argument in favor of probabilistic approaches is its presumed ability to
provide a more integrated assessment of the safety of the full system. This claim
comes in three forms.
First, some argue that by providing an integrated account of the full system,
probabilistic approaches are able to provide a higher safety level, for instance in
cases when several elements are cross-correlated (Allen 1981; Kuijper and Vrijling
1998). Kuijper and Vrijling (1998) give the example of a sea dike that protects a
polder. If the polder is adjoined by a river as well, the resulting safety level is lower
than if there is no river (and hence, no risk of flooding from the river).
Although this argument is often made, its theoretical underpinning is rather weak.
True, the probability of failure of some components of a system can often be
accurately calculated in a PRA; however, in the calculation of the system’s total
probability of failure, assumptions have to be made about how the different
components contribute to the system’s failure, how they interact, and whether or not
the list of failure mechanisms can reasonably be assumed to be complete. Difficulties
in correctly assessing these issues will make the estimated failure probability of the
whole system uncertain. It would also be wrong to say that safety factors differ from
PRA in not taking the whole system into account. In a safety-based design of a
bridge, a safety factor is applied to the loading of the bridge as a whole, and the parts
are optimized to achieve the targeted capacity. This is a holistic approach in the same
way as the calculation of the probability of a bridge collapse is holistic.
A second claim based on the presumed integrative approach is that
probabilistic design allows for comparison of the strengths of several elements
within a system and that they can accordingly indicate which element to
improve. Probabilistic approaches seem therefore fit for identifying critical
elements and setting up maintenance schemes (Čepin 2002; Kong and Frangopol
2005; Vesely et al. 1994; Wang et al. 1996). This argument has force. As noted in
Section 4, experience from the nuclear industry indicates that a PRA can be used to
identify weak components in a system even if an accurate total probability of
system failure cannot be calculated. Especially fault tree analyses can be useful in
this way (Khan and Haddara 2003; Lapp 2005); however, it should be noted that
non-probabilizable uncertainties need to be taken into account in maintenance
planning and that a one-sided focus on known failure mechanisms may be
dangerous (Arunraj and Maiti 2007).
A third proclaimed advantage related to the integrative approach of PRA is its
ability to provide a more inclusive analysis of failure, including failure due to human
error. Analysis of disasters and serious incidents shows that human error is one of
the major causes of structural failure (Nowak and Collins 2000). Attempts have been
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made to quantify risks of human error so that it can be included in an aggregate
calculation of probability of failure (Dougherty 1997; Reer 2008; Sun et al. 2009);
however, critics of such quantitative human reliability analysis argue that human
error depends on elements such as commitment, attitude, and experience that are
difficult to quantify. It is particularly doubtful whether meaningful numerical
probabilities can be assigned to human reactions to new and untested
technologies. These critics argue that attention should be redirected towards
qualitative or human-centered approaches that aim at identifying new types of
human failure rather than at quantifying currently known failure types (Hollnagel
1991; Mosneron-Dupin et al. 1997).
In sum, the claim that PRA is able to provide a more integrative and inclusive
account of a system’s safety and provide higher safety levels is rather weak, with one
exception: for intra-system comparison PRA approaches have capacities that do not
seem to be shared by any non-probabilistic methods. Such comparisons are
important for the prioritization of risk reduction measures and for the planning of
maintenance programmes.
5.4 Compatibility with Risk Assessment—Management Paradigm
A fourth advantage of probabilistic approaches concerns the organizational
distinction between risk assessment and risk management. As mentioned in
Section 2, the standard ideal for the risk decision process emphasizes a division of
this process into two distinct parts: risk assessment and risk management (National
Research Council 1983).
Compared to the safety factor approach, PRA seems more compatible with this
organizational division between risk assessment and risk management. The selection
of safety margins is a value-dependent exercise that forms part of the basis for
scientific and technological work. In contrast, a PRA can be performed on the basis
of scientific information alone. It is then up to the regulatory decision makers to set
the acceptable probability of failure; however, as we also saw in Section 2, in most
fields of engineering, there is no separation in practice between risk assessment and
risk management.
Technical standards are typically set by groups of experts who are entrusted both with
collecting and interpreting the scientific data and with proposing regulation. In structural
engineering, for example, the establishment of the new European construction standard
(Eurocodes) was characterized by organizational confluence of risk assessment and risk
management (Clausen and Hansson 2007). Similarly, in hydraulic engineering, Vrijling
et al. (1998) developed a unified framework for the assessment of safety in terms of
acceptable individual and societal risks levels, which they derived from accident
statistics and an estimate of the value of human life. Although the authors admit that
the final judgment is, in the end, a political one, the proposed approach tries to merge
risk assessment and management into one decision procedure.
These examples illustrate how the notion of probability and probabilistic
design enter the domain of risk management (i.e., the domain where decisions on
the acceptance of risks are to be made). Hence, although PRA in principle
facilitates a clear distinction between risk assessment and risk management, the
acceptable risk levels in PRA are often decided in the community of safety
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experts who make the assessment as well. Furthermore, decisions on risk
assessment and risk management issues are often made by the same expert
committees, such as committees for technical standard setting or for the setting
of exposure limits (Hansson 1998). Hence, the organizational structure does not
support or encourage a separation between risk assessment and risk management.
This is a severe limitation on the practical applicability of the proclaimed
advantage of PRA that it is well suited for making this separation.
In this section, we discussed four arguments that are used in favor of probabilistic
approaches. We showed that some of these were problematic and that the advantages of
probabilistic approaches over the safety factor approach should therefore be somewhat
qualified. The argument based on optimization was convincing but only for those PRA
outputs that can be well calibrated with actual frequencies. The argument regarding
compatibility with the standard view on the risk decision process was found to be sound
but seldom utilized in practice. The two remaining arguments, improved precision and
capability of system level analysis, were found to be rather weak.
6 Arguments for Using the Safety Factor Approach
In this section, we discuss three arguments against replacing safety factors by
probabilistic risk assessment. The arguments refer to computational costs and
simplicity, residual uncertainties, and security.
6.1 Analysis Costs and Simplicity
Probabilistic models promise to provide accurate estimates of failure probabilities that
depend on many different input variables. The costs for data acquisition and
computation tend to increase rapidly with the number of input variables. In practice,
this leads either to unworkably long time for the analysis or simplifications of the model
(with an unavoidable decrease in accuracy). Especially when the additional time also
involves delays in the design and engineering process itself, the simplicity of the safety
factor approach may be an advantage, also from a cost–benefit point of view. In the
building industry, the efficiency of the building process is often more important than the
amount of material used. Hence, reducing the construction time may—also from a cost–
benefit perspective—be preferable over saving construction material.
Moreover, the simplicity of the safety factor approach can also make mistakes less
likely. The importance of simplicity in safety work is known from chemical plant
design. Plants with inherently safer technologies tend to be simpler in design, easier
to operate, and more tolerant of errors (Overton and King 2006). Similarly, simpler
calculation or design methods may be preferable over complex ones since they
reduce the likelihood of mistakes in the calculations and hence, the likelihood of
mistakes in the construction itself.
6.2 Capturing Residual Uncertainties
One of the important characteristics of probabilistic methods is that they can take
potential adverse effects into account only to the extent that their probabilities can be
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quantified (Clausen et al. 2006; Hansson 2009a; Knoll 1976). Although attempts are
made to quantify as many elements as possible, most notably human errors, this can
at most be done approximately. In practice, these difficulties may lead to a one-sided
focus on only those dangers that can be assigned meaningful probability estimates.
Probabilistic approaches tend to neglect potential events for which probabilities
cannot be obtained (Hansson 1989; Knoll 1976: p. 411). Safety factors, on the
contrary, are intended to compensate also for in practice unquantifiable uncertainties
such as the possibility that there may be unknown failure mechanisms or errors in
one’s own calculations. It is a rational and not uncommon practice to set a higher
safety factor to compensate for uncertainty. This is done routinely in toxicology
(Fairbrother 2002; Santillo et al. 1998) and it seems logical to do this in other fields
as well.
Safety factors are not the only method in safety engineering that takes
uncertainties into account. The same applies to safety principles such as inherent
safety and multiple safety barriers. These principles have in common that they
introduce some degree of redundancy in the system, which is often an efficient way
to protect also against dangers for which meaningful probability estimates are not
available. If one of the safety measures fails for some unknown reason or if an
unforeseen failure mechanism is activated, then an additional defense can provide
protection.
Such “extra” safety measures may not be defensible from the perspective of a
cost–benefit perspective, but they may still be justified from the perspective of
protection against uncertainties (e.g., uncertainties about the probabilities of known
risks and about unknown failure modes). For an example of this, suppose that a ship
builder comes up with a convincing plan for an unsinkable boat. A PRA shows that
the probability of the ship sinking is incredibly low and that the expected cost per
life saved by lifeboats would be exceptionally high. There are several reasons why
the ship should still have lifeboats: The calculations may possibly be wrong, some
failure mechanism may have been missed, or the ship may be exposed to some
unknown danger. Although the PRA indicates that such measures are inefficient, we
cannot trust the PRA to be certain enough to justify a decision to exclude lifeboats
from the design. Similar arguments can be used, for instance, for introducing an
extra safety barrier in a nuclear reactor although a PRA indicates that it is not
necessary. This is, of course, not an argument against performing PRAs but an
argument against treating their outcomes as the last word on what safety requires.
6.3 Security and Vulnerability
A third argument in favor of the safety factor approach is related to security threats.
So far, we have focused on safety, that is, the protection against unintended harm;
however, the attacks on the twin towers on September 11, 2001 showed that not only
“acts of nature” threaten the integrity of an engineering structure. We also need
protection against another type of threat, namely those following from intended
harm. This distinction is often expressed with the terms safety (against unintended
harm) and security (against intended harm). Golany et al. (2009) refers to the former
as probabilistic risk and the latter as strategic risk (where “strategic” refers to
environments in which intentional actions are taken; it should be noted that Golany
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et al. do not discuss the epistemic uncertainties that may also be present in strategic
situations). An important distinction is that in the latter case there is an adversary
who is capable of intelligent behavior and adapting his strategy to achieve his
objectives. This has several implications.
First, it is in practice seldom meaningful to try to capture the likelihood of
intended harms in probabilistic terms. Instead of assigning probabilities to various
acts by a terrorist, it is better to try to figure out what actions would best achieve the
terrorist’s objectives. In such an analysis, the terrorist’s responses to one’s own
preparative defensive actions will have to be taken into account (Parnell et al. 2008).
Game theory (that operates without probabilities) is better suited than traditional
probability-based analyses to guide prevention aimed at reducing vulnerability to
terrorist attacks and most other intentional threats.
Secondly, as noted by Golany et al. (2009), whereas the criterion of effectiveness
is adequate in safety work, in security work it should be replaced by the criterion of
vulnerability. Vulnerability can be understood as a weakness that can be exploited by
an adversary. The adversary’s aim is not to maximize the likelihood of this loss but
rather to maximize the loss itself (e.g., by targeting critical infrastructures and
facilities). The optimal protection against terrorist attacks thus involves strategies to
reduce this potential for loss. Probabilities do not have a central role in deliberations
on how best to achieve such a reduction.
Sarewitz et al. (2003) add force to this line of argument by pointing out that
vulnerability reduction can be considered a human rights issue, which in some
situations may give it priority over economic optimization. Since modern society
has an obligation to ensure that all citizens are provided a basic level of protection
and that some fundamental rights are respected, economic arguments should not
always be decisive in resource allocation. The authors give the example of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which requires that all public buses be provided
with wheelchair access devices. This requirement was first opposed on economic
grounds. Cost–benefit analyses showed that providing the buses with wheelchair
access devices would be more expensive than providing, at public expense, taxi
service for people with disabilities. The measure was nevertheless introduced in
order to realize the right of people with disabilities to be fully integrated into
society. The right to protection against violence can be seen as a similar
fundamental right to be enjoyed by all persons. Such a right can justify protection
even when a PRA or a CBA indicates that the resources would be “better” used
elsewhere.
7 Discussion
Now that we have discussed the arguments in defense of probabilistic approaches
and of safety factors, can we decide which approach is preferable? The (obvious)
answer is no; both approaches are of value and it is does not seem constructive to see
them as competitors. It should be recognized that neither of these methods can, in
practice, tell the full truth about risk and safety (Hansson 2009b). In order to see how
we could combine the insights from both approaches, let us reconsider the objectives
of the two approaches as explained in Sections 3 and 4.
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As we saw in Section 4, there are two different interpretations of the failure
probabilities calculated in a PRA. One of these treats the calculated probabilities as
relative indices of probabilities of failure that can be compared against a target
value or against corresponding values for alternative designs. This interpretation
seems unproblematic. It should be realized that it refers to a relative safety level;
not all elements are included so it does not correspond to frequencies of failure in
the real world (Aven 2009). Instead, this interpretation provides “a language in
which we express our state of knowledge or state of certainty” (Kaplan 1993). It
can be used to compare different engineering components within some engineering
system or as a tool for priority setting and for the effect evaluation of safety
measures. It is in this context of local optimization that probabilistic analysis has
its greatest value (Lee et al. 1985).
The other interpretation treats the outcomes of PRA as objective values of the
probability of failure. According to this view, these probabilities are not to be
seen as merely relative indicators but as (good estimates of) objective
frequencies. In a world that has no uncertainties but only known, quantifiable
risks, this would indeed be a valid assumption; however, we do not live in such a
world. In practice, this means that failure probabilities often include experts’
quantified estimates of certain probabilities, and these estimates are unavoidably
subjective (Caruso et al. 1999). Often some phenomena are excluded from the
analysis. In these cases, we cannot translate a probability of failure from one
context to the other. To compare the safety of nuclear power plant with the safety
of a flood defense system on the basis of PRAs of the two systems is an uncertain
and arguably not even meaningful exercise since their uncertainties are different
and difficult or perhaps even impossible to compare.
Let us now turn to the safety factor approach that was said to be intended for
compensating for five major categories of sources of failure. Two of these, namely
higher loads and worse material properties than those foreseen, are targeted both by
safety factors and PRA. Taking seriously the higher precision of probabilistic
approaches, quantitative analysis of these sources of failure should at least in many
cases preferably be based on probabilistic information.
The main advantage of the safety factor approach over PRA concerns the other
three sources of failure that are unquantifiable: imperfect theory of the failure
mechanisms, possibly unknown failure mechanisms, and human error (e.g., in
design). PRA is not capable of capturing those uncertainties. This is a major reason
why PRA should be seen as one of several tools for risk assessment and not as the
source of final answers on risk assessment; however, current safety factors and other
acceptance criteria, as laid down in codes, standards and regulations, may lead to
suboptimal allocation of scarce resources (Rackwitz 2004).
Given that probabilistic approaches are incapable of capturing the non-
quantifiable uncertainties and that current safety factors can be overly conservative
with respect to known risks, how could current design codes in engineering be
improved? In the literature, at least three approaches are described. The first two
approaches depart from PRA and try to include uncertainties in the calculation of the
probabilities, either by introducing an “extra” variability among the statistical
parameters to account for the lack of information (Slijkhuis et al. 1999) or by
applying safety margins to the probability itself (Vrijling 2001); however, especially
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the first approach leaves us with the problem of secondary uncertainties (i.e., the
problem on how to estimate the uncertainty about the uncertainty). The third, more
widely advocated approach is the inverse of the second. In this approach, the safety
factor is defined in probabilistic terms (“partial safety factors”) (Elishakoff 2004).
The reason why this approach is preferable over the second (applying safety margins
to the probability itself) is that it leaves more room for incorporating considerations
of security. As shown in Section 6, protecting against security threats requires a
fundamentally different policy, namely reducing vulnerability rather than estimating
in numerical terms the probability that a particular plant, building, or technological
system will be subject to an attack. Traditional safety engineering approaches are
better equipped for addressing this.
To conclude, our comparison of safety factors and PRA suggests that the two
should be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Using PRA may
lead to a one-sided focus on those dangers that can be assigned meaningful
probabilities. Since not all dangers can be quantified and since most decision making
is done under conditions of uncertainty, PRA cannot provide the final answer to
safety issues. This holds even more when security threats come into play. On the
other hand, when optimization becomes important—be it in the prioritization of
maintenance measures or in situations where we are faced with hazards that cannot
be eliminated—PRA can be an indispensable tool for priority setting and for the
effect evaluation of safety measures.
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